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A "Dual System", of Family Law
Revisited: Current Inequities in
California's Child Support Law
By SHANNON BET-rIS NAKABAYASHI*
All happy families are alike but an unhappy family is unhappy after
its own fashion.
2
Contemporary life offers countless ways in which.., families [can
be] made unhappy .... No society can assure its children that
there will be no unhappy families. It can tell them, however, that
their Government will not be allowed to contribute to the pain.
3
FORTY YEARS AGO, Stanford law professor Jacobus tenBroek wrote
a series of landmark law review articles calling attention to what he
termed a "dual system" of family law in California: one system for the
middle and upper classes and one for the poor.4 While noting terms
such as "the poor" and "poor law" were anachronistic, if not conde-
scending, in the twentieth century, tenBroek used these words to
highlight the biggest problem with California's family law system-the
California legislature's adoption of the ideologies and structures of
seventeenth century Elizabethan Poor Law.
5
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1. SeeJacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development,
and Present Status (pts. 1-3), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 (1964), 16 STAN. L. REV. 900 (1964), 17
STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965).
2. LEo ToLs-roy, ANNA KARENIN 13 (Rosemary Edmonds trans., Penguin Books 1978)
(1954).
3. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 633-34 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
4. SeeJacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development,
and Present Status (pt. 1), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 257 (1964).
5. SeeJacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development,
and Present Status (pt. 3), 17 STAN. L. REV. 614, 614 (1965). The "poor laws" are most closely
replicated in modern Social Security laws. See id; see also generally William P. Quigley, Back-
wards into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the Millennium Resemble English Poor Law of the
Middle Ages, 9 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 101 (1998).
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Professor tenBroek postulated that a dual system of family law
existed in California. One system was for the poor based on the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children Act 6 ("AFDC") and the California
Welfare and Institutions Code, 7 directly borrowed from Elizabethan
Poor Law.8 The other system was for the "non-poor" based on the Cali-
fornia Family Code and common law.9 Although he acknowledged
"some intermingling of provisions and concepts among all four of
these legal complexes," tenBroek felt that "the major gap lies between
the two public aid laws on one hand and the codes and common law
on the other." '
[W]e have two systems of family law in California: different in ori-
gin, different in history, different in substantive provisions, differ-
ent in administration, different in orientation and outlook. One is
public, the other private. One deals with expenditure and conser-
vation of public funds and is heavily political and measurably pe-
nal. The other deals with the distribution of family funds, focuses
on the rights and responsibilities of family members, and is civil,
nonpolitical, and less penal. One is for underprivileged and de-
prived families; the other for the more comfortable and
fortunate. 1I
This Comment focuses on tenBroek's hypotheses as they apply to
one of the more contentious and volatile family law issues-child sup-
port. This Comment argues that not only does a dual system of family
law persist in California, but that state and national legislatures have
created a new tripartite system of child support-one for the very rich,
one for the very poor, and one for the rest of society. Part I traces the
history of child support law as it is inextricably linked with welfare and
poor laws, beginning with English common law and continuing with
the later invention of child support by American courts. Part II exam-
ines the uniform child support guidelines of today, showing that while
the very wealthy are allowed to determine their own levels of child
support, the separate child support law of the poor, enshrined in to-
day's welfare reform acts, egregiously burdens those who can least af-
ford to pay child support. The problem is only exacerbated by the
constant shifts in the public's attitude toward those receiving public
assistance. Part III examines several possible models of child support
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-709 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
7. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 2500-2611 (West 1964) (repealed 1964 and recod-
ified at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 17000-17409 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001)).
8. See tenBroek, supra note 4, at 257.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 257-58.
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and suggests that only by reevaluating our basic assumptions and atti-
tudes about child support can we hope to achieve a truly uniform and
fair system, one that recognizes that child support is both a public and
a private responsibility.
I. .Background
A. Family Law and Child Support Prior to the Twentieth Century
1. English Common Law Roots
Family law as it is known today did not exist prior to the late nine-
teenth century. 12 What is commonly thought of as family law tradition-
ally encapsulated only the legal rights of husbands and fathers-the
right to control their property, wives, and children.13 Divorce was not
prevalent until the late nineteenth century. 14 The concept of child
support was also foreign to the English common law. According to Sir
William Blackstone, "[t]he duty of parents to provide for the mainte-
nance of their children is a principle of natural law .... By begetting
them, therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation, to en-
deavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed
shall be supported. 1 5
Support of children was considered no different than support of
any other indigent person and was handled as part of a complex sys-
tem in which responsibility was allocated among various local public
and private institutions. 16 Unlike family law established for the rest of
12. See id. at 258; see alsoJacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its
Origin, Development, and Present Status (pt. 2), 16 STAN. L. REV. 900, 915 (1964).
13. See tenBroek, supra note 4, at 258; see also tenBroek, supra note 12, at 915.
14. See Drew D. Hansen, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and Punish-
ment in Early American Child Support Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1123, 1127 (1999). Any legal issues
that arose during a marriage were originally decided by ecclesiastical courts. See tenBroek,
supra note 4, at 266. As tenBroek notes, "[f]amily law ... was created by the common law
courts. It was integrated into the main body of the nation's statutory law only as it was a
part of the feudal law of inheritance and wardship. Here the role of the courts was pri-
mary." Id. at 261.
15. 1 WILLIAM BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES *447 (emphasis added).
16. See Hansen, supra note 14, at 1129. It should be noted the role of children in
seventeenth and eighteenth century society, was dramatically different than today or even a
hundred years ago. See id. Except for the children of the wealthy, children were expected
to work and often provided an important source of income and support for their family.
See id. Indentures and apprenticeships were very common. See MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATr-
ING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THlE PRESENT
92 (1988). It was not until the nineteenth century that the growing American middle class
began to keep their children in school rather than putting them to work. See Hansen, supra
note 14, at 1130. Poorer families, however, had no choice but to keep their children work-
ing. See id.
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society, law applying to the family relations of the lower classes
"evolved as an integral part of the labor and poor law systems [and]
was the creation of Parliament."'17 The laws that governed poor fami-
lies had nothing to do with "family law" but instead focused on put-
ting as many people, including children, to work as possible. 18
Five fundamental beliefs encapsulated the goals and strategies of
Elizabethan Poor Law.' 9 These ideas shaped public aid laws in Britain
and America for centuries.20 The English legal system at that time be-
lieved that (1) all poor must work; (2) helping the poor actually hurts
the poor; (3) poverty is the result of moral failure (and the corollary
that all poor parents must be bad parents); (4) government responsi-
bility for the poor is best located at the local level; and (5) local assis-
tance is to be strictly limited to local poor. 21 Guided by this
philosophy, the common law began to divide the poor into worthy
and unworthy, limiting aid to those who truly "deserved" it.22 In the
case of children, the poor law's idea of child support was to remove
children from their morally unfit parents' home and place them in
apprenticeships or workhouses. 23
2. Dependency and Punishment-Supporting the Poor in Early
America
English common law was implanted without much change in the
American colonies. 24 Poverty continued to be a problem in early
America and the colonists soon enacted their own poor laws.2 5
17. tenBroek, supra note 4, at 261. The first attempt at a unified and cohesive poor
law was the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601. See Quigley, supra note 5, at 102. "Labor law"
refers to the Statutes of Labourers (1350), considered by many to be the first poor law
which was concerned with vagrancy and making sure that all who were able worked and
were not "idle." See id.
18. See Quigley, supra note 5, at 102. Typical provisions of the Elizabethan Poor Law
included: "[B]egging was forbidden. Employable poor were to be put to work in manufac-
turing projects .... The able-bodied refusing to work were to be sent to [prison] .... Poor
children were to be put to work or apprenticed." tenBroek, supra note 4, at 259.
19. See Quigley, supra note 5, at 101.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 101-03.
22. See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 16, at 151.
23. See Quigley, supra note 5, at 105.
24. See id. at 102.
25. See ABRAMovrrz, supra note 16, at 77. For example, in 1692 Massachusetts passed a
law that required officials to "set to work all such persons, married or unmarried, able of
body, having no means to maintain them, that live idly and use or exercise no ordinary and
daily lawful trade or business to get their living by." Id. at 77-78. Poor law legislation ap-
peared even earlier in the Plymouth Colony (1642), Virginia (1646), and Connecticut
(1673). See id. at 78.
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Modeled after the English laws, the colonial statutes emphasized local
responsibility and support of one's own family members.26 "They pro-
vided differential treatment ... based on... status as neighbor (resi-
dent) or 'stranger' (non-resident) and as deserving (helpless) or
undeserving (able-bodied) ..... 27
Colonists usually took care of "paupers" individually, giving them
work, taking them into their homes, or providing them with meals.28
"Puritan Calvinism considered economic rewards to be a sign of
predestined grace, and class hierarchies provided an opportunity for
the well-to-do to serve society and God by caring for those with less."29
One of the more egalitarian features of colonial poor law was the pro-
vision of "outdoor relief."30 Outdoor relief allowed a family to receive
aid quietly in their own home through the charity of their neigh-
bors. 31 Women were not forced to work outside the home and chil-
dren were not forcibly taken from their families. 32
As the nation expanded and moved from an agricultural econ-
omy to an industrialized one, seventeenth century methods for help-
ing poor families became impractical.3 3 "Given the incompatibility
between the colonial poor laws and the emerging economy, new
means had to be found to assist families in distress while stemming
rising relief costs, maintaining the labor supply, and enforcing the...
family ethic."34 Coupled with economic changes was the "new expla-
nation of poverty"-the emerging idea that the problems of the poor
were located in their lack of work and family ethics.35
The responsibility for supporting the poor soon fell on private
charities, which proliferated through the 1800s. 36 The private organi-
zations devoted themselves not only to helping poor women but to
promoting the "proper family life."37 Many poor were also institution-
26. See id. at 79.
27. Id.
28. See Hansen, supra note 14, at 1132-33.
29. ABRAmOVITZ, supra note 16, at 77.
30. See id. at 84. "Outdoor" referred to outside the workhouse, as opposed to "indoor
relief" whereby the poor were forced to live or work in the poorhouse. See id. at 84-86.
31. See id. at 84-85.
32. See id.
33. See Hansen, supra note 14, at 1131-32.
34. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 16, at 137.
35. See id. at 144. Abramovitz further notes that in the nineteenth century "the posses-
sion of wealth evidenced 'fitness' and that its opposite, poverty, signaled inherent weak-
ness .... [The] new theories rationalized the accumulation of wealth, held the poor in
contempt, and justified ... rampant nativism and racism . Id. at 148.
36. See id. at 150.
37. Id. at 151.
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alized.38 This was especially true for children. 39 "The law increasingly
sanctioned the practice of breaking up families to 'help' them. 40
Children were taken to orphanages where all contact with their par-
ents was cut off so that the parents' poverty would not improperly
influence the children. 4'
Private charities, however, proved to be an imperfect solution. 42
As America moved into the Progressive Era,43 many began to look to
the state legislatures and courts to create solutions to social
problems.4 4
3. The American Invention of Child Support-Applying Poor Law
Principles to Create a Support Obligation
Child support is an American invention. 45 Prior to the 1800s little
thought was given to the imposition of an affirmative legal duty on
parents to support their children. 46 As broad social changes began to
transform the family, there was a rise in single-parent families. 47 Amer-
ican lawmakers began to notice a correlation between divorce, or
more commonly desertion, and the subsequent poverty of a single
mother and her children. 48 Fearing that the poverty and dependency
38. See id. at 155.
39. See id. at 163-65.
40. Id, at 168.
41. See id. at 165-68.
42. See id. at 150-71.
43. See id. at 181.
Progressivism, the name given to the social reform movement that emerged at
this time, sought to modify the imperfections of capitalism without overthrowing
it. Led largely by corporate leaders and middle-class reformers, Progressivism
called for greater state involvement in the political economy in spheres where
voluntary solutions seemed to have failed.
Id. at 181-82.
44. See id. at 182.
45. See Hansen, supra note 14, at 1125.
46. See id. at 1133-34. There was, however, a remedy under the Elizabethan Poor Law
of 1601 for local parishes, as third parties, to recover costs of child support where a child
was absolutely destitute. See id. at 1134 n.59; see also tenBroek, supra note 4, at 279-87.
47. See Hansen, supra note 14, at 1127-29. There were numerous reasons for children
to be living with one parent or with other relatives, including death, divorce, desertion, or
migration by a parent to find work. See id. at 1127-31. However, this Comment focuses on
divorce and desertion as the primary cause of single-parent families, and assumes, for the
sake of simplicity, that it is almost always the mother who is left taking care of the children.
See generally ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 16 (discussing the broad effects of divorce and deser-
tion upon American women).
48. See Hansen, supra note 14, at 1127. During the nineteenth century the divorce rate
increased throughout America. See id. The number of divorces increased at a greater rate
in the western states because they had more liberal divorce laws. See id. at 1127 n.18. Yet,
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of these mothers and children would overwhelm local charitable re-
sources, American courts began to create a child support obligation,
"assert[ing] that a father had a legal duty to support his children. '49
Lawmakers created this new cause of action by implying a contract
between the father and whomever had taken over the responsibility of
providing "necessities to the child. '50 Under the new child support
doctrine, "any other person who supplies such necessaries is deemed
to have conferred a benefit on the delinquent ... [father], for which
the law raises an implied promise to pay on the part of the parent."'51
Soon, mothers were allowed to sue the fathers of their children for
the recovery of child support on the theory that they were also provid-
ing necessities to the children.52
A significant part of the growing law of child support also in-
cluded the imposition of criminal sanctions on the non-supporting
parent.5 3 This idea was taken from Elizabethan Poor Law provisions,
which provided that one who ignores his support obligations is de-
frauding the state by forcing single mothers and children to be depen-
dent on state aid.54
While child support was being created in family law courts, state
legislatures continued to develop their own remedies to the financial
pressures on communities caused by indigent children. 55 California
enacted legislation in 1901,56 which adopted the traditional features
of the Elizabethan Poor Law provisions. 57 This was followed by the
Indigent Act of 1933.58 According to tenBroek, these laws
regarded [the poor] as a distinct class ... ruled by provisions and
procedures which are not of general application .... [These laws]
regulated [the lives of the poor] as to the time, manner, form, and
recompense of labor, if any, movement and travel, place of abode
divorce still costs money and many choose desertion rather than taking the case to court.
See id. at 1131.
49. Id. at 1134.
50. See id. at 1136.
51. Id. at 1137 (citing Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 13Johns. 480 (N.Y. 1816)). "Neces-
saries" were very narrowly defined as "only those items required for bare subsistence." Id. at
1140.
52. See id. at 1139.
53. See id. at 1147-49.
54. See id. at 1145.
55. See tenBroek, supra note 12, at 939-44.
56. See 1901 Cal. Stat. 636-638.
57. See tenBroek, supra note 12, at 939.
58. See tenBroek, supra note 5, at 614 n.731 (citing 1933 Cal. Stat. 761 (later codified
at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 2500-2611 (West 1964) (repealed 1964 and recodified at
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 17000-17409 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001))).
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and living arrangements, personal and civil rights, and family
relationships.
59
B. Creation of Welfare and the Decline of Judicial Enforcement
of Child Support Payments
In 1935, the federal government enacted the Social Security
Act,60 eliminating the need for many state laws dealing with indigent
parents and children. 61 The federal legislation included provisions for
low-income families that did away with any need for local governments
and courts to pursue child support enforcement at all.62 AFDC, 63
which is part of the Social Security Act, established a partnership be-
tween the federal government and the states in which the federal gov-
ernment provided appropriations to those states adopting plans
approved by the Department of Health and Human Services. 6 4 The
states in turn provided minimum monthly assistance payments to fam-
ilies who met the AFDC requirements. 65 Since the AFDC system was
paying for most children in need of child support, many states, includ-
ing California, no longer pursued delinquent parents as a method of
funding poor relief.66
The fact that child support assistance was a product of legislative
rather than judicial efforts, however, did not make it any easier to
receive assistance. Families had to meet certain conditions mandated
by the state in order to qualify. 67 If they failed to meet such condi-
59. tenBroek, supra note 5, at 614 (emphasis added).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1399 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (including provisions for old age,
survivor, disability and health insurance, unemployment benefits, and aid to families with
dependent children).
61. See Henry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the
Public Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1, 4-5 (1990).
62. See id.
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-709 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). All legislation which is colloquially
referred to, both nationally and in California, as "welfare" originates with the 1935 Social
Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 652-668 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
64. See Laura W. Morgan, Esq., Child Support and the Anomalous Cases of the High-Income
and Low-Income Parent: The Need to Reconsider What Constitutes "Support" in the American and
Canadian Child Support Guideline Models, 13 CAN. J. FAM. L. 161, 163 (1996).
65. See id.
66. See Krause, supra note 61, at 4-5. According to tenBroek, by the 1960s there were
almost 250,000 children in California being supported by AFDC. See tenBroek, supra note
5, at 618. Ninety percent of these children were living in a single-parent family with an
absent father. See id. Almost forty percent of the childrens" parents had never been married
at all. See id.
67. See Krause, supra note 61, at 7; see also Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family
Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REv. 229, 253 (2000); Deborah Harris, Child Support for Welfare Families:
Family Policy Trapped in Its Own Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 619, 621
(1987-1988).
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tions, they were denied assistance. As tenBroek stated, "[H] e who pays
the bills can attach conditions, related or unrelated to the purpose of
the grant."68 These conditions emanated from the "public ... need to
keep the bill down" and were constantly changed by legislatures de-
pending on popular whim.69 The conditions that applied only to
AFDC families included: criminal sanctions; regulations on family re-
lations, such as who could live together and where; financial imposi-
tions upon non-relatives, such as step-parents; and caps on the
number of children for which the state was willing to pay.70 These
conditions were absent from the child support system used by those in
the upper and middle classes.
C. Reform in the 1970s and 1980s
1. Title IV-D-Mandatory Enforcement
As stated above, for the first forty years that the AFDC was in exis-
tence, many states all but ignored child support enforcement, espe-
cially when it came to enforcing obligations owed to low-income
families. 71 This changed in 1974 when Congress passed the Family
Support Act 72 ("FSA"), codified as Title IV-D of the Social Security
Act, which required states receiving AFDC funds to establish and en-
force child support obligations.73 Title lV-D required states to desig-
68. tenBroek, supra note 5, at 676.
69. Id. at 676-77.
70. See id. This last condition, limiting the number of children, was unfortunately
sometimes a product of periodic political movements early in the twentieth century advo-
cating eugenics theories. See generally Nicole Huberfeld, Three Generations of Welfare Mothers
Are Enough: A Disturbing Return to Eugenics in the Recent "Workfare" Law, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S
L.J. 97, 125 (1998). For the earlier half of the twentieth century, California led the country
in sterilization of social "undesirables," often the poor and minorities. See Beverly Hor-
sburgh, Schrodinger's Cat, Eugenics, and the Compulsory Sterilization of Welfare Mothers: Decon-
structing an Old/New Rhetoric and Constructing the Reproductive Right to Natality for Low-Income
Women of Color, 17 CARDOzo L. REV. 531, 554 (1995); see also Huberfeld, supra, at 125.
General issues regarding constitutional protections of those receiving AFDC benefits
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses have been
examined on numerous occasions by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483
U.S. 587 (1987) (upholding AFDC provision that disallowed benefits for children receiving
child support); Lyng v. Castillo, 447 U.S. 635 (1986) (upholding the definition of "house-
hold" for federal food stamp programs); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1969) (up-
holding a Maryland cap on the number of family members who could receive benefits).
71. See Krause, supra note 61, at 4-5.
72. Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2351, 2351-58 (1974) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-660 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
73. See id.
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nate agencies to collect support.7 4 The primary goal behind the
legislation was to reduce the federal cost of the AFDC program. 75
Congress increasingly recognized that AFDC costs could be reduced
by extending support enforcement to potential recipients, therefore
making sure that families never "got on" welfare to begin with. 76 How-
ever, unlike AFDC, the FSA enforcement provisions applied to any
family regardless of whether they were receiving public assistance. 77
Title IV-D cemented family law and child support to Social Secur-
ity and welfare. 78 After Congress passed Title 1V-D, the two systems
became even more intertwined. 79 A result of this interaction was a
multi-track policy for child support enforcement.80 Welfare families
still continued to bear a larger administrative and procedural burden
while, ironically, research shows middle-class families benefited the
most from FSA child support enforcement. 81
The child support system for welfare recipients became more
burdensome because of its mandatory requirements. 82 While child
support enforcement for middle-class parents was voluntary, filing for
and assigning child support was a prerequisite for poor women to re-
ceive aid.8 3 One advocate noted that this created a relationship be-
74. See id. Until recently, the designated agency in California was the district attor-
ney's office for each county. SeeCAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11475.1 (West 1991) (repealed
1999). The district attorneys' offices in turn established special Family Support Divisions.
See id. Legislation passed in 1999 called for a phasing out of the use of district attorneys'
offices and the creation of a separate state agency under the direction of the Franchise Tax
Board to handle collections. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 17300-17320 (West Supp. 2001).
75. See Krause, supra note 61, at 6.
76. See id. The enforcement legislation throughout the past thirty years has been quite
extensive. AFDC recipients are required to legally assign all rights to any support payments
to which they are entitled to the local enforcement agency. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 11477 (West Supp. 2001). That agency has the power to establish paternity, use a na-
tional law enforcement locator service to track the putative father down, and then attach
his wages, imposing criminal sanctions if necessary. See Krause, supra note 61, at 8-9.
77. See Krause, supra note 61, at 6 n.26.
78. See Amy E. Hirsch, Income Deeming in the ADC Program: Using Dual Track Family Law
to Make Poor Women Poorer, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 713, 733-34 (1987-1988).
79. See id. at 734.
80. See id. at 735.
81. See Krause, supra note 61, at 6-7. One of the most controversial aspects of the
enforcement measures is that AFDC recipients get none of their child support payment at
all, while non-AFDC, usually middle-class, families get their checks directly, using the gov-
ernment as a free collection agency. See id. In AFDC cases, the government keeps the entire
support payment for the child, even if the amount exceeds the amount the government
has made in AFDC payments. See id. For example, if the calculated child support for a
particular child is $350 per month, the state will keep the entire $350 it received from the
non-custodial parent, even if the state only paid out $100 to the custodial parent for AFDC.
82. See Hirsch, supra note 78, at 735.
83. See id.
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tween the recipient and the government akin to a "supersexist
marriage. '8 4
You trade in "a" man for "the" man. But you can't divorce him if he
treats you bad. He can divorce you of course, cut you off anytime
he wants. But in that case "he" keeps the kids, not you. "The" Man
runs everything. In ordinary marriage, sex is supposed to be for
your husband. On AFDC you're not supposed to have any sex at
all. You give up control over your body. It's a condition of aid ....
"The" man, the welfare system, controls your money. He tell [s] you
what to buy and what not to buy, where to buy it, and how much
things cost. If things-rent, for instance-really costs more than he
says they do, it's too bad for you.8
5
2. Uniform Guidelines
Another significant congressional child support reform of the
1980s was the creation of a national uniform guideline for establishing
support.86 The 1988 FSA mandated that by 1994 all states wishing to
continue receiving federal funds must implement presumptive guide-
lines for child support.87 The goal of the child support guidelines was
"increasing compliance through fairness" by eliminating any factor
that could lead to arbitrariness. 88 In California and a majority of
states, judges were given a formula that was theoretically applicable to
all families, taking into account both parents' net income and the per-
centage of time each spent with their children.8 9 It was hoped this
unified system of child support would eliminate the duality problems
between poor and middle-income families previously pointed out by
critics such as tenBroek.
II. The Problem: A Tripartite System of Child Support
The problem with the child support system in California today is
that despite federal legislative efforts, it is not uniform. Not only is
there still a tiered system of family law in California, but a tripartite
system has developed-one for the very rich, one for those receiving
84. ABRAmOVITZ, supra note 16, at 313.
85. Id. at 313-14 (quoting Johnnie Tillmon, a welfare mother and leader of the Na-
tional Welfare Rights Organization).
86. See generally Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378,
98 Stat. 1305 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also Family Sup-
port Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 1,00-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
87. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 666-667 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also Guidelines for Setting
Child Support Awards, 45 C.F.R. § 302.56 (2000).
88. See Morgan, supra note 64, at 176.
89. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 4050-4076 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001).
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welfare or AFDC,90 and one for everyone in between."' The new os-
tensibly "uniform" system does function well for a greater majority of
Californians. However, the disparity between rich and poor results in
a fundamentally unfair system, as the family lives of the poor are still
governed by legislative proposals and popular anti-welfare sentiment.
A. The Uniform Statewide Guidelines-How Child Support Works
for the Majority of People
The mandated statewide uniform guidelines establish the re-
quired child support for most families. 92 California has chosen to use
an income-share child support model.9 3 This model takes a flat per-
centage of both parents' income and factors in how much time they
spend with their child.9 4 Under the uniform guidelines, there is little
room for judicial discretion. Instead, regardless of circumstances, the
same formula and factors are used for everyone and are presumed to
be correct.95
The formula in its simplest form is as follows: CS = K[HN - (H%)
(TN) ], where CS = child support amount, K = amount of income to be
allocated for child support (a constant set forth in section 4055(b) (3)
of the California Family Code), HN = high earner's net monthly dis-
posable income, H% = approximate percentage of time high earner
has or will have primary physical responsibility of the children, TN =
total net monthly disposable income of both parties. 96 The formula is
based on the presumption that a more equitable result comes from
using the parents' net disposable income, rather than factoring in
their monthly expenditures.9 7 Rather than having all families pay a
90. See The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.) [hereinafter Personal Responsibility Act]. The Personal Responsibility Act over-
hauled the entire welfare structure and officially abolished AFDC, replacing it with a new
block-grant program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families ("TANF"). See id. Since
most people still associate welfare with the acronym AFDC, this Comment will use AFDC
instead of TANF. See Brito, supra note 67, at 233 n.8.
91. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4057(b) (3) (West 1994) (creating exceptions to the guide-
line presumption for extraordinarily high-income parents); see also discussion supra note 81
(describing the different procedures for AFDC families).
92. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4055 (West Supp. 2001).
93. See Morgan, supra note 64, at 173-76; see also generallyJane C. Venohr & Robert G.
Williams, The Implementation and Periodic Review of State Child Support Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q.
7 (1999).
94. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4055 (West Supp. 2001).
95. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4057 (West 1994).
96. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4055 (West Supp. 2001)
97. See RUTrER GROUP, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: FAMILY LAw § 6:165 (2000).
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flat rate percentage, the formula operates similarly to federal income
tax on a somewhat progressive scale.98 Once a guideline amount is
calculated, it is then adjusted upwards depending on the number of
children the parent is required to support.99 As the formula is cum-
bersome for most people to apply, most counties use a spreadsheet
program to perform the calculations.100
The amount of child support determined under the guideline
formula is presumed to be correct.101 This presumption can be rebut
ted only by showing that application of the formula would be "unjust
or inappropriate in the particular case." 10 2 In general, however,
judges are required to order the guideline amount and may deviate
from this rule only in special circumstances."' 3 "[W]hen ordering
98. See id. Section 4055(b) of the California Family Code provides the following table:
Total Net Disposable Income Per Month K
$0-800 .20 + TN/16,000
$801-6,666 .25
$6,667-10,000 .10 + 1000/TN
Over $10,000 .12 + 800/TN
CAL. FxA. CODE § 4055(b)(3) (West Supp. 2001).
99. See RUTrER GROUP, supra note 97, §§ 6:174-175.
100. The Judicial Council permits the use of approved spreadsheet programs to calcu-
late guideline child support. See RU-rER GROUP, supra note 97, §§ 6:186-195. The following
spreadsheet is an example. Half of the spreadsheet, which indicates a proposed payment
schedule that would be advantageous for tax purposes, has been left out. In this example, a
non-custodial father, with one child, not in daycare, who spends no time with that child
and makes $3,513 a month, or $2,530 after taxes, will have to pay $633 a month in child
support. The important variables are emphasized in bold.
Father Mother DissoMaster(tm)V.98-1 (c)1998 CFLR
# of Children 0 1 Input: Monthly
% time with NCP 0 0 Year 1999
Filing Status SINGLE HH/MLA Tactic 8 (f)
# of Federal Exempts 1 2
Wages+Salary 3513 1566
Self-employ income 0 0 Settings hanged
Other Taxable income 0 0 Guideline CS/U
AFDC+CS received 0 0 [County] SS/A
Other nontaxable income 0 0 Nets: Adjusted
New spouse income 0 0 Husband 2530
IRA, Keogh, adjustments 0 0 Wife 1495
SS paid prey marriage 0 0 Combined 4025
CS paid prey marriage 0 0
Health insurance 01 0 Child Care 0
Oth medical expense 0. 0 GDL CS 633
Property tax expense 0 0 GDL SS 0
Interest expense 0 0 Total 633
101. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4057(a) (West 1994).
102. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4057(b) (West 1994).
103. See County of Stanislaus v. Gibbs, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819, 820 (Ct. App. 1997).
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child support the trial court lacks discretion to vary from the presump-
tively correct amount, calculated by applying the algebraic formula in
the statute"1 0 4 unless there is a statutorily defined exception, such as
the one for very wealthy parents discussed below."15 If a court wishes
to deviate from the guideline amount, the judge must state in writing
or on the record "[t] he reasons [why] the amount of support ordered
differs from the guideline formula amount."1 " Given that judges must
get through dozens of cases every day, 107 the likelihood of having time
to make an exception is very small.
Several cases have challenged the validity of the guidelines' pre-
sumptions. 10s One of these cases, County of Stanislaus v. Gibbs, "'9 actu-
ally shows how the guidelines can yield positive results. In Gibbs, the
defendant father had an illegitimate child with a woman who had no
choice but to apply for welfare assistance.1 0 Pursuant to state welfare
rules, the mother had to file a complaint to establish paternity and to
collect child support against the defendant Gibbs.' Gibbs admitted
paternity but contested the $838 he was ordered to pay in child sup-
port, claiming that the court should not have used the guideline fac-
tors and challenging the statutory presumption that the guideline
amount was correct."t 2 Gibbs argued that even though he made over
$50,000 per year as a parole officer, his substantial debt and the three
children he was supporting with his current wife made it impossible
for him to pay the $838 per month. I3 The trial court believed Gibbs's
argument and reduced the amount of support to $675 per month.' 14
The county appealed.' '5
On appeal, the fifth district court found that the family court
judge had abused his discretion.' '" The court held that the guideline
principles are not to be altered unless there are clear special circum-
104. In re Marriage of Carter, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 2 (Ct. App. 1994).
105. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4057(b) (3) (West 1994); see also discussion infra Part II.B.
106. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4056(a)(2) (West 1994).
107. See Catherine Bridge, The Do-It-Yourself Dilemma: Family Courts Trying to Cope with
Crush of Pro Per Litigants, RECORDER, June 30, 2000, at 1.
108. See generally In re Marriage of Fini, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749 (1994); In re Marriage of
Norvall, 237 Cal. Rptr. 770 (Ct. App. 1987).
109. 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819 (Ct. App. 1997).
110. See id. at 821.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. Gibbs actually argued he was entitled to a hardship deduction, a deduction
from child support due to a party's extreme financial burdens. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 822.
116. See id. at 822-23.
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stances, usually reserved for those who are truly impoverished and,
therefore, entitled to a hardship deduction.1 7 The defendant owned
a $340,000 home in the San Francisco Bay Area and the combined
income in his home was over $100,000 per year. 18 Gibbs's illegitimate
child was entitled to share in the income and lifestyle of Gibbs's other
children, and the court admonished the defendant for complaining
after he had "received a windfall by not having had to support [his
son] until he had reached the age of 15."119 The order of the lower
court was reversed, showing that, at least in this example, justice was
served by rigorous adherence to the formula. 120 Moreover, the case
also illustrates the difficulty that a trial court may have in fashioning
child support outside of the uniform guidelines.
B. The Three Pony Rule-How Child Support Law Is Applied to
the Very Wealthy
California Family Code section 4057121 states that "[t] he amount
of child support established by the [guideline] formula . . . is pre-
sumed to be . . . correct [unless] . . . [t]he parent being ordered to
pay child support has an extraordinarily high income and the amount
determined under the formula would exceed the needs of the
[child]. " 122 In such cases the guideline formula is discarded, and the
court makes its own independent inquiry into the appropriate
amount of support.t 23
The philosophy behind providing special rules for extraordinarily
high-income parents is the fear that: "(1) such support constitutes the
distribution of the obligor [custodial] parent's estate; (2) such sup-
port provides an inappropriate windfall to the child; [and] (3) such
support may also infringe upon a parent's right to direct the lifestyle
of his or her children."12 4 Several state courts have determined that
although children are entitled to support from their parents, they are
not entitled to too much, distinguishing between the necessities of life
and what has been termed a "good fortune trust."'125 One professor
called this "the three pony rule," as in "no child needs three po-
117. See id.
118. See id. at 821.
119. Id. at 825.
120. See id. at 824-25.
121. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4057 (West 1994).
122. Id.
123. See White v. Marciano, 235 Cal. Rptr. 779, 783 (Ct. App. 1987).
124. Morgan, supra note 64, at 192.
125. See id. at 194.
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nies."'126 Therefore, judicially determined support from high-income
earners should be limited. Non-custodial parents are often leery of
having the other parent benefit from a high award of child support
and, in order to prevent a windfall to the custodial parent, will try to
limit support to their child's basic needs. 27
One disturbing trend in child support litigation among the very
wealthy is the tendency of courts not to require high-income earners
to provide financial documentation. 128 While it is customary to allow
parties in support actions discovery of each other's financial records
before a support determination is made, several California appellate
courts have held that financial information regarding high-income
earners is "irrelevant" and that courts should not inquire into the
party's net worth or lifestyle.' 2 9
One illustration of the different rules for wealthy parents is the
infamous case of actor Emilio Estevez.' 131 Estevez had been paying
more than $14,000 per month for the support of his children, without
a court order.' 1 The childrens' mother sought a court order to guar-
antee the support and requested financial information to prove Es-
tevez earned $300,000 monthly. 93 2 The mother was not permitted to
make any discovery motions pertaining to Estevez's income. 3 3 The
court felt such discovery was "burdensome and oppressive" to the ac-
tor. "34 Since the actor stipulated he was a high-income earner and that
he was willing to pay any reasonable amount of child support, the
court did not make any further inquiries. 35 Although under the uni-
form guidelines, Estevez would have had to pay $35,000 a month, the
court held he only had to pay what was deemed fair, not a percentage
of his salary, like non-wealthy parents. 13 6
126. Id. at 198 n.69.
127. See Philip G. Seastrom & Michelle L. Kusmider, Child Support and the High Income
Earner, 41 ORANGE COUNTY LAw. 40, 41 (1999).
128. See id.
129. See White v. Marciano, 235 Cal. Rptr. 779, 782 (Ct. App. 1987); see also Estevez v.
Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470, 471 (Ct. App. 1994).
130. See Estevez v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470 (Ct. App. 1994).
131. See id. at 472.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 475-76.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 475.
136. See id. The parties ultimately agreed that $14,500 a month was reasonable support.
See id. Some jurisdictions appear to be softening the strict discovery rules for wealthy par-
ents. SeeJohnson v. Superior Court, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that in a
support action against professional basketball star LarryJohnson, the mother ofJohnson's
child was entitled to discovery of Johnson's net worth).
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One factor that the rules pertaining to extraordinarily high-in-
come earners seem to ignore is that the purpose of child support law
in California is not just to make sure that the child's needs are met,
but to ensure that the child has a share in the high-income earner's
standard of living, regardless of who has custody. 137 The California
Family Code specifically states as one of its mandatory principles that
"[c]hildren should share in the standard of living of both parents.
Child support may therefore appropriately improve the standard of
living of the custodial household to improve the lives of the
children." 138
C. Blood From a Stone-How Child Support Law Is Applied to
Low-Income Families
1. A Typical Case
As a 1998 portrayal of the child support system in Los Angeles139
pointed out, the people who arrive at courthouses to contest child
support orders are not stereotypical deadbeat parents, "pulling up in a
flashy car with a new wife on one arm and a high-priced lawyer on the
other."' 40 Rather, such parents are "overwhelmingly blue-collar work-
ers who ride the bus or drive aging cars, showing up for court in jeans
and a work shirt."14 In a system where over half the cases feature pro
per, or self-represented, litigants, 142 what happens can often seem to
be the product of "'a soulless, wretched system."' 1 43
A family profiled in the Los Angeles Times provides an all too typi-
cal example. Omar Moreno, a 35-year-old teacher's aid, paid $191 a
month in child support for an ex-girlfriend's child. 144 The mother's
welfare debt "weighed so heavily on Moreno and his [current] wife
that they declared bankruptcy and moved in with his mother."' 45 In
137. See Seastrom & Kusmider, supra note 127, at 44.
138. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053(f) (West 1994).
139. See Greg Krikorian & Nicholas Riccardi, Failure to Provide: Los Angeles County's Child
Support Crisis. A Three Part Series, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998, at Al, Oct. 12, 1998, at Al, Oct.
13, 1998, at Al; see also Brae Canlen, On the Assembly Line, CAL. LAw., Dec. 1998, at 43;
Bridge, supra note 107, at 1.
140. Greg Krikorian & Nicholas Riccardi, For Parents Seeking Relief, Courts Don't Always
Help, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1998, at Al.
141. Id.
142. See Bridge, supra note 107, at 8.
143. Krikorian & Riccardi, supra note 140, at Al (quoting defense attorney Art
Goldberg).
144. See id. Under state welfare laws, the money actually went to repay the welfare sys-
tem and not directly to the child. See Krause, supra note 61, at 6-7.
145. Krikorian & Riccardi, supra note 140, at Al.
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an effort to improve his life, Moreno went back to school part-time.146
He wrote letters to the district attorney's office to lower his payments,
but he received no response. 147 Not long after writing the letters,
Moreno was summoned to court during a routine effort by the district
attorney's office to raise his payments. 48 Moreno appeared at the
hearing and received the good news that due to his reduced income,
he was entitled to a decrease in support payments. 149 However, since
Moreno did not file the proper paperwork, he forfeited his right to
the decrease. 1 51
Because his income was too high to retain free legal assistance,
Moreno was left to confront the situation without an attorney. 15 He
began missing payments and his debt grew along with compounded
interest. 52 The district attorney's office then seized half of his
paycheck and his entire income tax refund in order to reduce the
debt he owed. 15 At the time of the Los Angeles Time article, Moreno
and his family were receiving assistance from food banks. 154 When re-
porters questioned the district attorney's office about Moreno's case,
they replied that it was not their "obligation to represent this person
in court .... [I]n the end it is still an adversarial legal system. 1 55
Moreno may have even gotten off easy. Other parents have been put
in jail for failure to pay support. 56 Throughout most of this harrow-
ing process parents are not entitled to any court-appointed counsel. 157
What happens all too often to these inexperienced litigants is a
"bullying of opponents unschooled in legal intricacies."' 158 Pro per liti-
gants cannot afford attorneys to represent them and the system is so
overcrowded that district attorneys often make mistakes, overcharging
parents or charging the wrong person entirely.'5 9 Despite California's
record of having the toughest child support laws in the nation, the
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. See id. California Penal Code section 270 makes willful failure to provide for one's
children a misdemeanor with a maximum sentence of one year in county jail. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1999).
157. See Krikorian & Riccardi, supra note 140, at Al.
158. Id.
159. See id.
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state also has one of the worst track records in collections.1 60 In 1996,
over $8.2 billion in child support went uncollected, leaving many fam-
ilies on the brink of poverty.161
2. California's Choice of Child Support Model Hurts Rather Than
Helps
As noted, California uses an income-share child support
model. 162 This model takes a flat percentage of both parents' income
and factors in how much time they spend with their child.163 While
there is data to suggest that this model helps low-income families, its
fundamental presumptions lead to unfairness.' 64 The formula not
only presumes that as income increases the percentage devoted to the
child decreases,165 but it also does not reflect the fundamental notion
(present in other formulas) that supporting dependents is impossible
until one's own basic support needs are met. 166 For example, Califor-
nia's guideline does not take fundamental personal expenses into ac-
count (such as rent, mortgages, utilities, food, insurance, credit card,
and loan payments), and thus a court could order a parent to pay over
half of his or her disposable income to support his or her child. 167 If a
parent is making minimum wage, it becomes impossible to live up to
his or her support obligations. The current child support model
forces many parents into poverty and does not recognize that many
parents have to default on their child support obligations because
they cannot afford them.168
3. Political Pressures on AFDC Are Integrally Tied with Child
Support
When President Clinton took office in 1992, one of his first goals
was to reform the welfare system. 16 9 These efforts led to the Personal
160. See Nicholas Riccardi & Greg Krikorian, County, State Both Get Blame on Child Sup-
port, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at Al.
161. See id.
162. See Morgan, supra note 64, at 173-76; see also generally Venohr & Williams, supra
note 93.
163. See Morgan, supra note 64, at 173-76.
164. See id. at 183-84.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 180.
167. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4055 (West Supp. 2001).
168. See Krause, supra note 61, at 12-13.
169. See Paul K Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the
1996 Welfare Act, 30 FAM. L.Q. 519, 524 (1996).
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Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.170
The Act ended federal entitlement to AFDC and replaced it with
block grants to states, making aid to poor families a local, and not
national, responsibility.1 71
Under the new system, "child support enforcement was incorpo-
rated within the broader welfare reform issue because it was viewed as
an important element of a new system for single-parent families." 172
Despite this benign-sounding purpose, political concerns regarding
the poor infiltrated the child support system through the new welfare
reform act.173 Guided by a philosophy that parents, not the govern-
ment, should be paying for their children's support, and by the no-
tion that if a parent cannot afford to support his or her children then
he or she should not be having children, social agendas began to dic-
tate the enforcement of child support obligations.1 74 Because Califor-
nia must comply with all federal requirements in order to receive
much needed grants, nationwide attitudes about child support greatly
affected what happened to the poor in this state. 175
a. The Focus on Deadbeat Dads
A fundamental impetus behind child support legislation is the
fear that when children are not financially supported, then they,
along with their custodial parent, will be forced to go on welfare and
thus be supported by taxpayers. 176 Therefore, when Congress decided
in the 1990s that the number of people receiving welfare needed to be
drastically reduced, legislators first looked to child support enforce-
ment. Congress started with the Child Support Recovery Act of
1992.177 The Act provided for criminal sanctions (up to two years in
170. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
171. See Legler, supra note 169, at 519.
172. Id. at 524.
173. See Brito, supra note 67, at 240 n.45.
174. See id. at 229-30.
175. See Legler, supra note 169, at 558.
176. See Roger J.R. Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads: The Problem with the Direction of
Welfare Reform, HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'V 1, 2-3 (1994) (discussing fears regarding "cycle
of dependency").
177. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994). The Act was challenged in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995), for exceeding Congress' Commerce Clause power and also for violating the
Tenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has so far refused to hear both challenges. See
United States v. Black, 125 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1033 (1998). The
defendants in Black were convicted for willfully withholding child support payments. See id.
at 456. They challenged the Act as unconstitutional for exceeding Congress' authority
under the Commerce Clause. See id. The Seventh Circuit rejected their claims. See id.
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prison) for any parents who "willfully failed to pay their child support
obligation." 178 The Act was later amended and entitled the Deadbeat
Parents Punishment Act of 1998.179 While the idea of stepping-up law
enforcement efforts to collect child support payments is not inher-
ently unsound, the idea ignores several major problems.
One such problem is that many low-income parents simply can-
not pay, as the parents of most children on AFDC are likely to be
impoverished themselves. 180 According to Professor Henry Krause,
"[m]any a defaulting father's obligation, even if originally assessed
fairly, does not correspond to his current economic circum-
stances .... [O]ur current emphasis on enforcing the father's obliga-
tion clouds our judgment about how much money we can realistically
expect the father to provide."' 8' California courts have little discretion
to lower the presumptive guideline amount, especially when AFDC is
involved. 8 2 The only discretion courts do have is in awarding hard-
ship deductions for subsequent children. 83 Thus, fathers making as
little as minimum wage can end up owing tens of thousands of dollars,
money that "short of winning the lottery, the father has no hope of
ever being able to pay."' 8 4
The other major problem with enforcement measures that target
deadbeat dads is that the procedures for establishing paternity and
giving notice of child support hearings are far from perfect. 85 Prose-
cutors are given financial incentives to obtain judgments against par-
ents of AFDC children quickly, often at the expense of justice.186 A
recent report by the Judicial Council of California found that seventy
percent of all child support orders are obtained by defaultjudgment. 187
"Very often by the time a support obligor receives actual notice of the
support order the accumulated amount of arrearages totals tens of
thousands of dollars. These arrearages amounts, particularly for a low
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
179. 18 U.S.C § 228 (Supp. 1V 1998).
180. See Krause, supra note 61, at 12-13.
181. Id.
182. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4057 (West 1994). Under California Family Code section
4056, if ajudge does want to deviate from the guideline he has to go through the laborious
process of declaring for the record official findings as to why the guideline should be
disregarded. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4056 (West 1994).
183. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 4071-4073 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001).
184. Krause, supra note 61, at 14.
185. See Greg Krikorian & Nicholas Riccardi, In 9 of 10 Child Support Cases, D.A. Comes
Up Empty Handed, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998, at Al.
186. See id.
187. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3652 historical notes (West Supp. 2001).
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wage earner, are a significant obstacle to good faith compliance."' 8
There are also fewer obstacles in the way of prosecutors seeking to
obtain a wage garnishment against an AFDC parent than there are
against a middle- or upper-class parent who has access to an attorney
who can make the proper motions to a set aside or dismiss the judg-
ment for lack of notice.
The Judicial Council further noted that "thousands of individuals
each year are mistakenly identified as being liable for child support
actions. As a result of erroneous child support actions, the ability to
earn a living is severely impaired, assets are seized, and family relation-
ships are often destroyed."1 89 Add to this the fact that a significant
number of the accused cannot afford an attorney. 190
b. The "Family Values" Campaign
Child support for AFDC families is also subjected to a "family val-
ues" philosophy, popular among some legislators, which claims that
single-parent families and the decline of traditional family structures
cause poverty. 19 1 While it is absolutely undeniable that, as a result of
divorce, women and children see dramatic declines in their in-
come, 192 proponents of the political and moral ideology of welfare
reform advocate that if these mothers would get married or stay mar-
ried, they would not be in financial trouble.1 93 The fact that the new
welfare reform proposals desire to regulate family behavior is obvious
from the opening "findings" of the Personal Responsibility Act. The
Act states that "[m]arriage is the foundation of a successful soci-
ety . . . .Marriage is an essential institution of a successful society
which promotes the interests of children .... Promotion of responsi-
ble fatherhood and motherhood is integral to successful child rearing
and the well-being of children .... "194
Coupled with the idea that single-parent families are to be
frowned upon is the idea that women receiving AFDC should have as
few children as possible.' 95 The new welfare reform proposals have
been criticized as maintaining a "'strings attached' tactic of condition-
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Krikorian & Riccardi, supra note 185, at Al.
191. See Brito, supra note 67, at 240 n.45; see also ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 16, at 33-34.
192. See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 16, at 352 (discussing the "feminization of poverty").
193. See Brito, supra note 67, at 234.
194. Personal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110-11
(1996), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 601 note (Supp. III 1997).
195. See id.
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ing receipt of public assistance on compliance with coercive and puni-
tive behavioral regulations," particularly towards family size and birth
control.1 96 "[Tihe measures are designed to discourage childbirth
both by imposing a financial penalty on women who bear additional
children and by providing a monetary incentive to women who use
prescribed methods of birth control."' 97 Often such measures are
founded on the idea that welfare itself encourages poor women to
have more children who will themselves continue to be on welfare. 198
Procreation by welfare mothers is deemed irresponsible behavior on
the theory that if they could not afford children, they should not have
them to begin with.' 99
Several years ago, in a debate in the California Assembly over
whether or not to allow welfare parents to claim hardship deductions
and thus reduce the amount of their child support payments, one
member stated that "an AFDC family has a 'social contract' with gov-
ernment to aid only those children in the family at the time the aid is ap-
proved."200  Any adult that has further children is behaving
"irresponsibly" and has violated his or her contract with the state. 20 1
The state then should not be obligated to support these additional
children.20 2 It is hard to imagine a similar statement being made
about middle- or high-income families.
As recently as December of 1999, California had a provision
which did not even allow parents of children receiving AFDC to claim
hardship deductions.20 3 The provision was repealed by the Child Sup-
196. Id. at 241.
197. Id. (referring to the birth control "Norplant").
198. See id. at 234. Section 101 of the Personal Responsibility Act states that children
born into families receiving welfare assistance are three times more likely to be on welfare
when they reach adulthood than children not born into families receiving welfare. See Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 101 (8) (F), 110 Stat. 2105, 2110 (1996), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 601 note
(Supp. III 1997).
199. See Brito, supra note 67, at 242.
200. County of Orange v. Ivansco, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 889 n.7 (Ct. App. 1998) (em-
phasis added) (citing Memorandum to the Members of Senate Democratic Caucus from
Chairperson Diane E. Watson, Preliminary Analysis of Welfare Proposal).
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4071.5 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001) (enacted 1994 and re-
pealed 1999). Section 4071.5 read:
For purposes of computing the minimum level of child support under Section
4070, no hardship shall be deemed to exist and no deduction from income shall be granted if
aid payments are being made pursuant to Chapter 2 ... of Part 3 of Division 9 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code on behalf of a child or children of the parent
seeking the deduction, even if the payments are being received by the other
parent.
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port Enforcement Fairness Act of 2000,204 but only after it had limited
the resources of AFDC parents for five years. An appellate court found
the provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution. 20 5 The provision was repealed before it reached
the California Supreme Court.
III. The Solution: Rethinking Welfare and the Societal
Obligation to Children
Tolstoy is frequently quoted as saying something about how all
happy families are the same . . . . Of course, he's got it totally
wrong, completely ... backward. Happiness is infinite in its vari-
ety .... [A]ll the unhappy families are pretty much the same ....
Listen to any unhappy person tell his tale of woe, and it sounds like
every other tale of woe.2 0 6
Laws, particularly those pertaining to families, need continuity
and predictability, and they should not be based on popular ideolo-
gies and outmoded moralities. Family law needs to be completely sep-
arated from the ideologies of welfare law so that there can truly be a
uniform system of child support law. While parents should be respon-
sible for the maintenance of their children, child support needs to be
viewed in a dramatically different manner. Blaming deadbeat parents
will not solve the problem because the large majority of them can not
afford to pay.20 7 As one legal commentator noted, it is like trying to
get the proverbial "blood from a stone."20 8 There needs to be a funda-
mental shift in the way American society views support for children.
Child support needs to be seen as both a private and a public
responsibility.
A. Changing the System from Within
Many judges, lawyers, and advocates have set forth proposals at-
tempting to change the inequities in the current child support sys-
tem.20 9 Every year dozens of bills are put before the state legislature
Id. (emphasis added).
204. 1999 Cal. Assem. B. 280.
205. See Ivansco, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 892.
206. ELIZABETH WURTZEL, PROZAC NxION 255 (1994).
207. See Krause, supra note 61, at 12-13.
208. Amy E. Watkins, The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992: Squeezing Blood from a Stone,
6 SETON HALL CONST. LJ. 845, 845 (1996).
209. See Bridge, supra note 107, at 8.
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with the hope that small changes to the California Family Code can
solve the problem. 2 10
1. Removing the Punitive Aspects of Child Support
One positive change has been the phasing out of the district at-
torney's offices as local child support enforcement agencies.2 1 l As
noted, the punitive aspects of child support and welfare law, codified
since the first Elizabethan Poor Laws, have often been considered
needlessly burdensome and oppressive.2 1 2 California's decision to use
the local district attorney's offices for what are routinely civil matters
only increased the atmosphere of fear and hostility between parents
and the state. 213 A look at the infamous situation in Los Angeles shows
just how bullied and pressured many parents feel. 21 4 Removing a crim-
inal enforcement agency from the equation certainly helps to limit
the punitive nature of the system.
2. The Family Law Facilitators' Program-Creating Parity Within
the System
So far, the most successful state program has been the creation of
Family Law Facilitators' offices in each county.2 15 These offices take
federal money, given to the state for child support collection, and use
the money to educate pro per litigants on how to represent them-
selves and protect their own rights. 2 16 The Facilitators' program has
not only eased the burden on overworked family court staff but has
vastly increased the chances that the due process rights of low-income
litigants will be protected. 2 17
B. Changing Perspective-Alternative Models
One of the primary problems plaguing child support law is the
myriad of artificial concerns and motives society places on it. As ten-
Broek noted,
210. See id. at 8-9. Ironically, many of these bills are blocked by the lobbying efforts of
the family law bar. See id.
211. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 17305 (West Supp. 2001).
212. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 14, at 1147-51; see also Quigley, supra note 5, at 103.
213. See TimothyJ. Lee, District Attorney Collection of Child Support: The Need For Reform, 55
S. BARJ. 156, 156 (1986).
214. See Krikorian & Riccardi, supra note 140, at Al.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See Bridge, supra note 107, at 8.
Spring 20011 CALIFORNIA CHILD SUPPORT LAW
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
[The] fundamental [fiscal] motive from time to time has been aug-
mented by the punitive, the moralistic, the political and restrained
by the humane and rehabilitative, [which have] been determina-
tive in molding the character and fixing the features of the law of
the poor in general and the family law of the poor in particular.21 8
In order to get away from a tiered system, all of these motives-
the punitive, moralistic, political, and especially the financial-need
to be questioned and possibly abandoned. The following models ex-
plain possible suggestions scholars have made for doing so that look at
child support as both a public and private responsibility.
1. The European System
Many European countries and most industrialized nations pro-
vide child allowances for their citizens (usually financed by taxation)
through "advanced maintenance payment systems." 21 9 In England, for
example, "all families receive a 'child benefit' to defray the costs of
raising children." 2 1' Single-parent families receive an additional "One
Parent Benefit."2 2 1 Sweden has the "oldest and most generous system,"
giving single mothers who are not employed outside the home "an
advanced maintenance payment, plus a family allowance, a housing
subsidy and social assistance equal to 94% of the average worker's
wage. '"222 Single working mothers get wages and benefits equal to
123% of the average wage.22 3
A somewhat similar program was attempted in Wisconsin, and for
a while this experiment was the subject of much debate among family
law advocates. 224 However, this system soon showed that it could not
realistically be compared with the European models. It retained many
of the more restrictive provisions of the Federal AFDC programs and,
in order to keep costs down, it was applied only to selected AFDC
recipients. 225 No real attempt to duplicate the "advance maintenance
payment system" has ever been made in the United States.
218. tenBroek, supra note 5, at 676-77.
219. See Hansen, supra note 14, at 1152 (citing JONATHAN BRADSHAW & DAVID
PIACHAUD, CHILD SUPPORT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 103-07 (1980)).
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. Harris, supra note 67, at 653 (citing Paula Roberts, Child Support and Beyond: Map-
ping a Future for America's Low-Income Children, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 594, 597 (1988)).
223. See id.
224. See id. Called the "Garfinkel plan," the program is named for its creator, Irwin
Garfinkel of the Institute for Research of Poverty in Wisconsin. See id.
225. See id. at 653-54.
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Implementing the European model would solve many problems
in the child support system by removing the moral and political phi-
losophies that serve only to hinder AFDC and thus child support for
the poor.2 2 6 If all families could be assured of getting enough money
to truly support their children, the problems of trying to extract
money from most poor deadbeat parents would also disappear.
2 27
While the European model may still be the best option, some scholars
have offered other solutions closer to more traditional American
philosophies.
2. The Social Security Model
It has been suggested that child support could be revolutionized
by making it more similar to Social Security. 228 "While the United
States has generous, publicly funded benefits for elderly Americans,
no comparable program exists for children."229 The modern system of
Social Security provides old-age support for all retired workers based
on the idea that younger generations will pay support for the elderly
through Social Security taxes. 230 This system pays for all retirees and
their spouses, not just those who have children who will later pay into
the Social Security system.231 Taxation for Social Security removes the
burdens of providing for old age from the family context.
232
The argument is that child support should be construed the same
way. A separate child support tax could be taken out of all workers'
paychecks regardless of whether or not they have children. 233 The tax
would be justified on the theory that children are valued members of
society who will later contribute when they join the work force by pay-
ing their own taxes. 23 4 According to Professor Henry Krause, a tax-
payer should "reciprocate" by bearing an appropriate share of the cost
of supporting those who will later bear the burden of old-age support
for all.2 35
Arguably a system of support through taxation already exists in
the AFDC/TANF programs. However, it is not the taxation that makes
226. See id. at 635.
227. See id.
228. See Krause, supra note 61, at 25.
229. Hansen, supra note 14, at 1152-53.
230. See Krause, supra note 61, at 25.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
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Krause's suggestion different, but its social context.236 Making child
support a payment due to all children based on their future participa-
tion in the work force and potential financial contributions through
taxes would remove the moralistic and punitive elements of current
child support programs. 237 Moving to such a system would have all the
benefits of aid for the underprivileged children without the structure
and rules that hamper current AFDC policy.
3. The Community Support Model
Yet another professor has suggested that child support could be
revolutionized by creating a system of community support similar to
community property laws 8.2 3 Marsha Garrison argues that rather than
relying on egalitarian laws to give money to children in need of sup-
port, parents should share in supporting their children so that there is
a complete "equality in living standards. '" 239 While traditional
"model [s] might focus narrowly on welfare prevention or more
broadly on poverty; a community model might seek full equality be-
tween parent and child or a more limited equality of basic re-
sources." 2411 The goal would be for all members of the family to have
equal standards of living even after divorce.
The problem with this model, aside from its complexities, is that
it does not address the problem of parents who completely abandon
their families and will not be available to share resources. It also ig-
nores the fact that just as with community property, many families are
so poor that upon dissolution there is nothing to share. Everyone in
such a situation remains in need of financial assistance. While this
model is unique in showing that it is capable of creating a uniform
system that treats everyone equally, 241 it ignores the fact that addi-
tional child support is often needed in families where resources are
scarce.
Conclusion
Since their inception, California's child support laws have been
based on the outmoded and ill-equipped tenets of Elizabethan Poor
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Paren-
tal Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REv. 41, 41 (1998).
239. Id. at 92.
240. Id.
241. See id.
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Law. The inequities caused by having multiple systems of family law
are devastating. To solve this problem, the issue of child support
needs to be addressed by our society in a dramatically different way.
Child support must be recognized as both a public and a private re-
sponsibility, a payment that society helps make when parents are finan-
cially unable to do so. Children in poverty should not be punished
because of societal or legislative feelings about the actions of their
parents. The only way to achieve a truly fair system of child support is
to remove the vestige of archaic poor laws and have one uniform sys-
tem that provides the same solutions for everyone.
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